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STICKY KNOWLEDGE AND COPYRIGHT
MARGARET CHON*
Knowledge is sticky because it adheres to people along social routes,
lodged within relational and collective modalities, as well as through
copyright's proverbial fixed works that can be transacted more freely.
Sticky knowledge may in fact constitute a much larger body of knowledge
than we usually acknowledge in intellectual property and may intersect with
copyright in unexpected ways. This Article delves into sticky knowledge,
which has been referenced often outside of intellectual property and
sometimes within the laws of patents and trade secrets but almost not at all
within copyright law. Under what circumstances will sticky knowledge
encourage robust knowledge transmission-or copyright's goal of
'encouragement of learning"? Understanding the scope and reach of this
kind of knowledge may point to optimal means to encourage knowledge
spillovers and reliability.
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I shall reconsiderhuman knowledge by stanrgfrom the fact
that we can know more than we can tell. This fact seems
obvious enough; but it is not easy to say exactly what it
means.'
Si tu sais que tu ne saispas, alors tu sauras.2
INTRODUCTION
In producing what counts as knowledge, copyright is both overinclusive and under-inclusive. Many have pointed to its overinclusiveness. 3 Copyright's threshold, including its arguably low
standards of originality and fixation, means that many works can and
1.

MICHAEL POLANYI,

THE TACrr DIMENSION

4 (Univ.

Chi. Press

2009) (1966).
2.
Attributed to Amadou HampAt6 BA (Tr: "If you know that you do not
know,
then
you will
know."
Amadou Hampdtd B1, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AmadouHamp%C3%A2t%C3%A9_B%C3%A2#Quotes
; to whom is also attributed: "En Afrique, quand un vieillard meurt, c'est une
bibliothbque qui brille. - "In Africa, when an old man dies, it's a library buring."
(1960 at l'UNESCO)). Id Both of these quotes exemplify sticky knowledge; they are
resistant to being verified in English by sources acceptable by Bluebook standards; the
original sources have not been translated into English and/or distributed widely enough
to verify accuracy. See E-mail from Cheikh Thiam, Assistant Professor, The Ohio State
University, to 0hIf6mi TAfw6, Director, Global African Studies, Seattle University
(March 31, 2011, 5:31 EST) (on file with author) ("I don't know where exactly this
quote, often attributed to A. H. B. is from, but it is something that is frequently
repeated in Senegal and Mali. There is even a Wolof proverb that says it in the same
words. And Ba's work is, in many ways, a transcription of the collective intellectual
production of the Fulani and the Bambana. All his tales for example, are transcriptions
of traditional tales. I would, therefore, not be surprised if he just used one of the Fulani
and Bambana proverbs. It is also important to note that most of Amadou Hamp6te BA's
work is still unpublished!"). Compare infra text accompanying notes 149-51 for
further discussion.
Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for
3.
Reform, 23 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/filesfbcltCPP.pdf:
The vast majority of copyrighted works created each year have little or no
commercial value. Billions of works, such as emails and business memos,
are created without the incentive of copyright and lack independent
commercial value as expressive works. Many other works that people
create, such as blog posts, are subject to copyright, although their authors
intend to distribute them without restraint or with fewer restraints than the
default rules of copyright impose. Many works are created with the intent to
exploit their commercial value as expression, but lack that value at
inception or perhaps enjoy evanescent commercial value that endures for a
much shorter period than the current copyright term.
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will be protected.4 The construction of knowledge by copyright assumes
that most meaningful creative knowledge can be captured, perhaps to
a fault.
Much of this Article examines the opposite proposition:
copyright's under-inclusiveness, even in an age of increasing digital
creation and distribution. If knowledge was adequately captured by
copyright-protected goods, then the mere existence of a book would
obviate the need for a teacher and the presence of a painting would not
require further explanation. Yet students still fill classrooms and
implicitly demand by their presence that teachers explain the contents of
their textbooks (if they can afford to buy them). And visitors to art
museums often feel that they do not comprehend a work of art unless it
is viewed within the context of an experienced critic's or docent's
guidance. In many, if not in most, cases much knowledge is not fixed
within and by copyright, although copyright girds much of what we can
and do find valuable to know. For it is also true that even the best
teachers often require books in order to be most effective, and even the
highly articulate guide cannot convey the power of visual art through
mere verbal description, however adroit.
Analogously, in the area of patent law, successful
commercialization often involves more than licensing the patented
invention per se, but also must include the penumbra of information
required to practice invention-information not necessarily disclosed in
the patent, or even if it is disclosed textually, needs further explanation
or demonstration in person. And in early stage innovation, James
Bessen has recently noted that "communication costs are significant not
only because they provide a degree of appropriability, but they can also
change the nature of innovative competition so that inventors might
even share knowledge."' These aspects of non-formalized knowledge

4.
Indeed, some have argued that the threshold is too low, resulting in many
unnecessary works. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating
Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1437, 1461 (2010) ("More controversially, one might question the social value of
promoting massive amounts of user-generated content. Debra Halbert notes that an
unauthorized Internet posting of Michael Jackson's "Thriller" has been viewed over
34,000,000 times and has generated 8000 comments."); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting
Originality,31 CARDozo L. REv. 451, 465 (2009).
5.

of

Law

James Bessen, Communicating Technical Knowledge 7 (Bos. Univ. Sch.

Working

Paper

No.

10-35,

2010),

available

at

http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1698802; see also Ashish Arora, Licensing Tacit Knowledge:
IntellectualPropertyRights and the Market for Know-How, ECON. INNOVATION & NEW
TECH. 41, 42-44 (1995) [hereinafter Arora, Licensing Tacit Knowledge] (arguing that

the transfer of know-how or tacit knowledge is more valuable when used in connection
with codified knowledge in the form of patents).
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have sometimes been called know-how, tacit knowledge, and/or
sticky information.6
Drawing from these various sources, I refer to this type of
knowledge here mostly as "sticky knowledge."' Unlike many of these
other scholarly forays, the focus in this Article is less on appropriability
of and commercial returns on sticky knowledge than on its potential for
positive spillovers and its reliability.
The "sticky" part of "sticky knowledge" refers to the aspects of
knowledge that have a stubbornly and sometimes irreducibly social
dimension,' which is not simply equivalent to the artifact of the
knowledge good itself, whether or not covered by intellectual property.
Positive knowledge spillovers may occur when the benefits of exclusive
rights in intellectual property are externalized to the public rather than
internalized within the rights-holder's bundle of rights. 9 Analogously,
6.
Ashish Arora, Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision of
Techmical Services in Technology Licensing Contracts, 50 J. DEV. EcoN. 233, 233
(1996) [hereinafter Arora, Contracting for Tacit Knowledge] ("Recent research on the
economic payoff from new technology has emphasized the importance of tacit
knowledge or know-how."); Eric von Hippel, "Sticky Information" and the Locus of
Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation,40 MGMT. SCI. 429, 430-31 (1994).
7.
Others have used the term "sticky knowledge" but my use is slightly
idiosyncratic. As this Article points out, all of the terms associated with this area are
somewhat opaque. In this Article, I substitute the term "knowledge" for von Hippel's
term "information" because in copyright, we are largely concerned with "works"
rather than with widgets, and knowledge is different from mere content or information.
8.
HARRY COLLINS, TACIT AND EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE 11 (2010) (describing
weak or relational tacit knowledge, which has to do with relations between people that
arise out of the nature of social life and "strong, or collective, tacit knowledge-the
knowledge that the individual can acquire only by being embedded in society"); see
alsoRobert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualismin Law andEconomics, 91 B.U. L. REv. 43,
67 (2011) ("Broadly, the transfer of knowledge is not individualistic. Rather, as Arrow
quotes Thorstein Veblen, '[tjhe commonplace knowledge of ways and means, the
accumulated experience of mankind, is still transmitted in and by the body of the
community at large.' The same is true of the creation of new knowledge, to which
Arrow suggests economists have not been sufficiently attentive, given its centrality to
economic growth. As with the transfer of existing knowledge, the acquisition of new
knowledge is, in primary part, social in nature. An individualistic approach to
knowledge would thus seem ill-advised." (quoting Thorstein Veblen, ProfessorClark's
Economics, 22 Q.J. EcON. 147 (1908), reprintedin THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF
SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 180, 186 (1919)) (footnotes
omitted)); Yanis Varoufakis, Where the Customers Are Always Wrong: Some
Thoughts on the Societal Impact of a Non-Pluralist Economic Education, I INT'L J.
PLURAUSM & ECON. EDUC. 46 (2009).
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
9.
REv. 257, 258 (2007) ("[Wle explain that in IP, unlike real property, a wide range of
externalities matter, because IP rights are much less certain than property rights and
because the decision to create a legal entitlement will determine whether or not a
transaction must occur. Second, we suggest that there is no reason to think that
complete internalization of externalities is necessary to optimize investment incentives;
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the "sticky" part of knowledge may be encouraged into more
transparent and/or transactable forms of knowledge, resulting in
positive spillovers.
Furthermore, drawing a critical distinction between what is
commonly called "content" in the copyright world and "knowledge,"
the "knowledge" part of "sticky knowledge" addresses the accuracy,
authenticity, contextual reliability, or veracity dimensions of knowledge
(what will be called "reliability" hereinafter). This is suggested by the
difference between "connaissance" and "savoir" as put forth by Paul
David and Dominique Foray:
The French language offers a distinction between 'savoir' and
'connaissance' that has no real equivalent in English, though
it can be conveyed by adding the qualifier 'reliable'. Reliable
knowledge ('savoir') means certified, robust knowledge that
has been legitimised by some institutional mechanism (be it
scientific peer review or collective memory and belief
systems). Other forms of knowledge ('connaissance') also
enable action (knowing how to do the gardening, DIY) but
have not been put through the same tests as certified
knowledge. What separates the two has less to do with a
contrast between the scientific and non-scientific than whether
or not the knowledge has been subjected to institutional
testing.o
Arguably all works protected by copyright have sticky knowledge
components. These aspects often can be ameliorated by codification
(such as fixation) or other forms of communication. Therefore,
stickiness always lies on a continuum." Often the reason for lack of
communication or codification has its source in a social dimension.
Nonetheless, sticky knowledge is often simply identified by its quality
of not being codified rather than because it is embedded within social
relations or because the knowledge is located in the social collective.12
This Article attempts to disentangle the elision.

at some point, there are decreasing returns (in terms of improved incentives) to
allowing property owners to capture more of the value from their inventions.").
Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, Economic Fundamentals of the
10.
20,
46 n. 1 (2003),
1 POL'Y FuTuRus EDUC.
Knowledge Society,
http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol= 1&issue= 1&year=2003&a
rticle=2 David PFIE 1 1.
11.
Saijad M. Jasimuddin et al., The Paradox of Using Tacit and Explicit
Knowledge: Strategies to Face Dilemmas, 43 MGMT. DECISION 102, 103-05 (2005)
(knowledge lies along a continuum of tacit and non-tacit).
12.
COLLINS, supra note 8.
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Despite being quite tangible, a work of art can be sticky because it
can be literally difficult to find,' 3 not to mention appreciated,
upon viewing without the help of others, as mentioned above. A book
may be sticky when it is not translated and therefore not accessible to
persons who cannot read the original language. A technical term in
computer code may be sticky because engineers in different parts of the
world are not communicating with each other about what each of them
thinks it means. 14 Art, book, and code in these examples are all
"works" that are codified enough to be protected by copyright and yet
their full knowledge-reach is not met. In other words, the social
dimension captured by the term "sticky knowledge" is both threaded
within works protected by copyright and circulated outside those works.
To use Eric von Hippel's terminology, "sticky information" does not
travel freely because it may be costly to "transfer that information to a
specified locus in a form usable by a given information seeker.""
Sticky knowledge is very much bound to people rather than to codes;
communication among people is key.
And of course, communication through cultural expression may
overcome stickiness: music is often characterized as a universal
language. Expressive knowledge through art can convey precisely what
we otherwise can't say or cannot even otherwise "know."' 6 And the
creativity that may flow from "misunderstanding" and reinterpreting,
remixing, and transforming accepted views of knowledge is endemic to
the expressive field of copyright.
Works, to use the copyright term of art, run the gamut from purely
expressive and creative to those that may have more educational or
utilitarian functions. As one part of an overall system of knowledge
governance, copyright covers knowledge directed at pure entertainment
as well as that generated for education or news reporting: from fanciful
to factual, as we say in the fair-use analysis. For almost all these types
of works, however, sticky knowledge has a role to play in fostering
knowledge reliability as well as knowledge spillovers. Scholars inside
13.

Bob Tedeschi, Apps as Tour Guides Through New York Museums, Step

by Step, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at B6.
ANNALEE SAXENIEN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION
14.
INSILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 157 (1994).
von Hippel, supra note 6, at 430 ("[D]efin[ing] the stickiness of a given
15.
unit of information in a given instance as the incremental expenditure required to
transfer that unit of information to a specified locus in a form usable by a given
information seeker. When this cost is low, information stickiness is low; when it is
high, stickiness is high."). Put another way, Harry Collins posits a weak form of tacit
knowledge (relational), which exists when knowledge is logistically demanding (it
would cost too much for an organization to invest in knowledge systems to replace the
tacit knowledge). COLLINS, supra note 8, at 94.
16.
I am indebted to Madhavi Sunder for this insight.
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and outside the field of law have unduly confined the discussion of this
type of knowledge to the patent and trade secret realms," perhaps not
recognizing that it may assist us in understanding whether and when it
promotes the various goals of copyright." It has obvious implications,
too, for conceptualizing the nature of intergenerational equity-a
significant dimension of distributional justice-or other aspects of
human flourishing; ends to which copyright is ostensibly dedicated
through its "encouragement of learning.""
Thus this Article addresses several types of information paradoxes,
different in kind, but not in significance from Kenneth Arrow's
information paradox. The latter forms the central thesis of the economic
analysis of much of present-day intellectual property law, 20 but the
paradox explored here is the knowledge of not knowing what
we know.2 1
One under-inclusion results from distributional asymmetry, caused
in part by a global divide in access to knowledge, where some may
have too much knowledge and others not enough. 22 Another underinclusion is caused ironically by the over-abundance of digital
information combined with indifference to the salience of sticky
knowledge, perhaps in conjunction with the lack of a curator's or
editor's skill and guidance in piecing different knowledge domains
See discussion infra Part II.
17.
18.
Perhaps this is because, as Greg Mandel, Jeanne Fromer, and others have
pointed out, we have separated the realms of patent and copyright law into distinct
creative areas. Gregory N. Mandel, Left Brain versus Right Brain: Competing
Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 44 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 283
(2010); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U.

L. REV. 1441 (2010).
19.
See 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
Vesting the Copies of PrintedBooks in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies,
during the Times therein mentioned), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.
com/anne.html; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The
Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations Without a Theme, 47 Hous. L. REv. 965,
971 (2010) (tracing ambiguity in the act's "encouragement of learning" goal);
Copyright Act of 1790, availableat http://www.copyright.gov/history/1790act.pdf.
KENNETH J. ARROw, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 152 (1971)
20.

("[The] fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for information [is that]
its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in
effect acquired it without cost.").
21.
See Bessen, supra note 5, at 3 (revisiting Arrow's model, which "assumes
zero communication costs"); see also Stuart Hannabuss, Narrative Knowledge: Eliciting
Organisational Knowledge from Storytelling, 52 ASLIB PROC. 402, 402 (2000)

(describing "unconscious incompetence").
I have explored this at great length elsewhere and will touch upon it again
22.
briefly, see infra Part IV, as it is relevant to the question of intergenerational equity.
See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Propertyand the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2821, 2823-31 (2006).
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(sticky and non-sticky) together.23 Even open-content or open-source
formats may be subject to systematic forms of social bias that are
unconscious but pervasive and significant,2 4 and thus sticky knowledge
may shape the reliability and distribution of even the most potentially
inclusive and well-intended knowledge-production systems, such as
distributed peer production.25
Once one recognizes the sticky knowledge aspects of copyright,
then what? The multiplicity of copyright's domains is bewildering and
can obscure the different sticky knowledge pieces that should be
connected in some way to non-sticky knowledge. Different areas of
copyright might demand differing degrees of tolerance with respect to
the information paradoxes of under-inclusion explored here. Much of
what copyright covers is arguably more open ended (often towards the
highly touted goal of creativity) than patent's subject matter, imbued as
it is with specific design constraints that inventors may face.
Frank Pasquale, Copyrightin an Era ofInformation Overload: Toward the
23.
Privilegingof Categorizers,60 VAND. L. REv. 135, 165 (2007) ("After developing the
pollution analogy further, I make the case for considering information overload as an
externality below."); see also Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-GeneratedContent,
2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1459, 1548. Jessica Litman argues, however, that we are at a
point in copyright history where the public-law framework should be disintermediated.
Jessica Litman, Real CopyrightReform, 96 IOWA L. REv 1, 39 (2010).
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN
24.
AND CLASS MAT-rER 29 (2010) (citing Shelley Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. Soc'Y 1297, 1316 (2007) (finding that women who
listed membership in the PTA in otherwise identical resumes were 79 percent less likely
to be hired than women with identical resumes but without PTA membership, 100
percent less likely to be promoted, offered $11,000 less in salary, and held to higher
performance and punctuality standards than non-mothers)); see also Jerry Kang &
Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Color-Blindness:Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA
L. REv. 465, 516 (2010) ("Recall the rdsum6 study that demonstrated discrimination
against Lakisha over Emily. That study found that '[a] White name yields as many
more callbacks as an additional eight years of experience on a resume.' We tend to
focus on the harm to the individual, but from the firm's perspective, this evidence
shows inefficient, non-profit-maximizing behavior." (footnote omitted)).
Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Citizen, in IMAGINING NEW
25.
LEGALITIES (Lawrence Douglas et al. eds., forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8-9) (on
file with author):
[One] way to approach the question of legal responsibility for the ongoing
configuration of networked individuals and communities is to consider more
generally how society ought to structure accountability for the design of
networked information technologies and artifacts. Among U.S. scholars of
technology law and policy, those questions too have conventional answers.
Many scholars who write about law and technology issues tend to think that
the development of technical standards and the evolution of digital products
and services are matters best regulated by the market rather than by
government. Effective technology policy thus is a matter of respectful
tinkering at the edge of essentially private processes.
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Nonetheless, there is a "reliability" value to copyright's
"encouragement of learning" project analogous to the "efficiency" or
"best mode" specifications in patent and trade secret law-a value that
can guide the certification of content that rises to the level of "savoir."
One claim here is that we may overestimate the potential of content
(digital or otherwise) by itself to promote knowledge. Creating content
and creating knowledge are vastly separate projects. In this sense, this
Article seeks to identify ways in which copyright law may not
encourage learning despite its liberality with respect to subject matter,
and more generally where intellectual property law, despite its mandate
of "progress," might be nonetheless regressive. 26
Moreover, knowledge governance is capacious: copyright is just
one aspect of knowledge management and is itself undergoing a rapid
transition in its modalities, ranging from a Byzantine public-law
framework to a pluralistic mix of de-centered private ordering
combined with technological protection measures and even structured
settlements involving major market actors. While the newer governance
modalities are not unproblematic, some of the tools in the areas of
governance, broadly construed, may assist in formulating the incentives
within these knowledge governance spaces. For example, contractual
terms of service might be viewed as a critical governance mechanism to
facilitate the attribution, creation, dissemination, and protection of
certain kinds of sticky knowledge that may be under-produced. This is
not to say that the standard doctrinal categories are irrelevant; surely
sticky knowledge will affect our understanding of the scope of the
derivative-work right, for example.
In parsing this potentially powerful but under-utilized conceptual
tool of sticky knowledge, I turn in Part I to the literature outside of
intellectual property, where the concept of "tacit knowledge" has been
a much more frequent inhabitant, in order to determine some first
principles of this notoriously slippery concept. Part II then returns to
Cf Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,
26.
123 HARv. L. REv. 809, 814 (2010) ("We are thus increasingly relying on intellectual
property law not so much to enforce social hierarchy as simply to conserve - or in
Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, to 'reproduce' - our system of consumption-based
social distinction and the social structures and norms based upon it. The result is that
intellectual property law now consists of two conflicting sides: the familiar progressive
side of the law, which works, in the terms of the U.S. Constitution, 'To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,' and the unappreciated sumptuary side of the law,
which is not progressive but rather socially and technologically reactionary."
(footnotes omitted)).
27.

JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND

THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (forthcoming 2012); Margaret Chon, Global
Intellectual Property Governance (Under Construction), 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.

349, 374-76 (2011), http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol12/iss1/art12/.
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intellectual property. Unlike much of the literature from which I draw a
fuller understanding of sticky knowledge, however, I am less concerned
with the appropriability and exclusivity of knowledge, and more
concerned with its potential for diffusion or knowledge spillovers and
its quality of "savoir." Copyright is one mode among many of
knowledge governance, although it is often appreciated only as a
mechanism for commercial transactions. In Part III, the Article
concludes with reflections about knowledge governance and
intergenerational equity: where we may fail to address the fact that we
"know more than we can tell" and therefore where our current
doctrines and governance mechanisms may fall short.
I. STICKY KNOWLEDGE

A. Outside of Law
Michael Polanyi, who is widely credited with first articulating the
concept of tacit knowledge, stated that "[w]e know a person's face, and
can recognize it among a thousand, indeed among a million. Yet we
usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we know. So most of this
knowledge cannot be put into words." 28 This is a statement about
inarticulable knowledge, as well as holistic knowledge.2 9 Originally

POLANYI, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis added). The element of holistic or
28.
Gestalt understanding within tacit knowledge is not emphasized in this Article. See
Robin Cowan et al., The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codficationand Tacitness,
9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 211, 212 (2000) ("Reference to the findings of Gestalt
psychology in regard to other perceptual phenomena formed another important aspect
of Polanyi's conceptualization of tacit knowledge: people appear to be perceptually
(and/or intellectually) aware of some objects and things about the world only as
entities-as illustrated by the identification of a particular human face or voice.
Knowledge of this kind consists of holistic understandings, and thus is not completely
amenable to purely reductionist analyses."). Nor is Polanyi's exploration of the
personal passion as an element of tacit knowledge explored here. MICHAEL POLANYI,
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 1962).
29.
Later, Polanyi rejected the term "science" as perhaps too imbued with
connotations of logical positivism and not enough with the social dimension discussed
here. Polanyi stated in a discussion with Carl Rogers at San Diego State University:
Yes, let us not attribute particular merit to something by saying, "This is
scientific." Let's describe its value and its reliability, its penetration and so
many other terms; and the example which you mention is very much to the
point; namely, creativity. Now, this is one of the objects which leads a very
precarious existence because the supposed methods of science cannot deal
with it; they can't do anything about it. And therefore, the theory which
science makes of itself tries to exclude it. It says, "Oh, this is just
psychology or sociology or something which doesn't belong to us. It's not
logic." I think that all this is unnecessary and actually misleading.
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denoting that certain aspects or types of knowledge are ineffable yet
still discernable, sticky knowledge defies attempts at being "expressed
in a particular language and recorded on a particular medium."o
While this powerful concept of a type of knowledge that "cannot
be put into words" has taken root in many disciplines, 3 1 it is also still
curiously indeterminate fifty years after being announced. This is a
result partly of its multi-layered set of meanings that have only been
parsed through repeated analytical forays. "Tacit knowledge" is often
used interchangeably with "know-how," 32 but the two terms are
distinct, in part because of their respective genealogies and different
usages. Whereas tacit knowledge retains a pentimento of its origins in
the philosophy of science, and is currently associated more with the
economics and management literature, know-how is more typically
associated with applied and commercial science or research, along with
legal scholarship and practice. 33 As Cowan, David, and Foray note in
mock despair,34 complete consensus around the concept of "tacit
knowledge" is elusive. Nonetheless it is fair to say that the current
literature coalesces around several insights: rather than a dichotomy
between sticky knowledge and codified knowledge, many posit a
knowledge continuum (or even cycle)," offering various accounts for

Dialogue between Michael Polanyi & Carl Rogers, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 5, 1966),
available at http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/polanyi-rogers%20dialogpdf.pdf.
30.
David & Foray, supra note 10, at 25.
31.
Interestingly, much of the literature of what is called here sticky
knowledge has been developed outside of the governance of knowledge (qua intellectual
property), and within the disciplines of anthropology, economics, geography, history of
science, information science, management, philosophy, science, technology and society
studies, and/or sociology of science-where its definitions have been more diverse than
within intellectual property. This tells us something already about sticky knowledgeknowledge, including sticky knowledge, can be cordoned off by the invisible
boundaries of local epistemic communities.
32.
Arora, supra note 5, at 42.
33.
The definition of know-how arises in cases involving trade secrets. For
example, Judge Arlin M. Adams defined it as "an employee's general knowledge, skill,
and experience . . . . even if these were acquired during employment." SI Handling

Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1267 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, J., concurring).
34.
Cowan et al., supra note 28, at 211 ("With increasing frequency these
days references appear in the economics literature to 'tacit knowledge'. More often than
not the meaning of this term itself is something that remains literally tacit-which is to
say, those who employ it are silent as to its definition.").
35.
Cristiano Antonelli, The Business Governance of Localized Knowledge:
An Information Econonics Approach for the Econonics ofKnowledge, 13 INDUSTRY &
INNOVATION 227, 237 tbl.1 (2006).
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lack of codification,"6 including economic and stubbornly social
dimensions of knowledge. The social aspects are often overlooked in
the legal literature.3 7 These are explored more below.
Sticky knowledge inevitably surrounds the transmission of
formalized knowledge. Christiano Antonelli claims that: "A fully
codified knowledge that can be easily transmitted and communicated
does not exist. Relevant absorption and assimilation activities are
necessary even for codified knowledge to be transferred among
individuals and organizations." 38 As discussed in the beginning of this
Article, the fact that a book is fixed does not eliminate this question of
absorptive capacity, which is "the ability . . . to recognize the value of

new information, assimilate it with existing knowledge and apply it to
create new capabilities." 39 Moviegoers, opera lovers, and dance
aficionados, for example, may still feel the need to discuss the impact
and meaning of what they have just experienced in theaters, gaining
insight from different perspectives of critics or others more
sophisticated in the audience, and then applying this awareness to their
own creative interpretations. The interpersonal dynamics that are so
critically important in the transfer of knowledge are complicated further
by culturally specific sticky knowledge as well as the absorptive
capacity of the receiver. To elaborate on von Hippel's original insight,
which he explored with respect to "problem-solvers,"' the concept of
sticky knowledge applies to all of copyright's knowledge exchangers
(whether producers or so-called users or consumers). Their respective
absorptive capacities provide a limit to knowledge diffusion. Thus
36.
COLLINS,

Almost all the literature lists some of these reasons, but none list all.
supra note 8, at 141-42 (for the most recent and logically developed

catalogue).
37.
Id. at 123-25.
Antonelli, supra note 35, at 230.
38.
Jamie D. Collins & Michael A. Hitt, Leveraging Tacit Knowledge in
39.
Alliances: The Importance of Using Relational Capabilities to Build and Leverage
Relational Capital, 23 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 147, 161 (2006); id. at 163
(summarizing a case study of NedCar Mitsubishi where "[m]iscommunication also
occurred because the two firms sometimes had different terms for the same part or,
conversely, the same term for different parts"); see also Ajay Agrawal, Engaging the
Inventor: Exploring Licensing Strategies for University Inventions and the Role of
Latent Knowledge, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 64 (2006) (describing "teachability" as
an aspect of tacit knowledge); Tim Reiffenstein, Codification, Patents and the
Geography of Knowledge Transfer in the Electronic Musical Instrument Industy, 50
CAN. GEOGRAPHER 298, 314 (2006) (describing how the Japanese firm Yamaha
recognized the value of American innovation, whereas U.S. Silicon Valley firms
ignored it).
von Hippel, supra note 6; see also Fromer, supra note 18, at 1484-94
40.
(describing patent law generally as "problem solving" and copyright law as
"problem finding").
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sticky knowledge lies along a continuum,
dichotomous with codified knowledge. 4 1

189

rather than being

1. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

Sticky knowledge is often reduced to simply uncodified
knowledge, regardless of the reasons for the lack of codification.
However, once the reasons for lack of codification are diagnosed,
sticky knowledge might be encouraged into more explicit forms of
knowledge-or alternatively, a decision could be made to leave the
knowledge tacit. Through a memorable line borrowed from Jack
Goody, David and Foray remind us that: "With the emergence of
codification, 'the problem of memory ceases to dominate intellectual
life."' 42 In any event, codification is often a choice.
Knowledge may be uncodified for economic43 or non-economic
reasons. Communication and/or codification of sticky knowledge can be
non-trivially costly. Much of the economic literature focuses on the
costs of making knowledge explicit, especially with increasing distance
from its origin." Codification also "consists in translating knowledge
into symbolic representations so that it can be stored on a particular
medium." 45 The implication is that the medium itself must be
susceptible to common interpretation by code-readers, and thus
codification may be subject to the predictable problems of technological
obsolescence, which adds a contingency to the cost equation."
One aspect that can be easily confused with lack of codification is
that of the "displaced codebook." As Dan Burk succinctly describes
this, "knowledge has been codified, but then internalized, so that the
41.
See Antonelli, supra note 35; see also Ikujiro Nonaka, Ryoko Toyama &
Akiya Nagata, A Firm as a Knowledge-Creating Entity: A New Perspective on the
Theory of the Firm, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1, 10 (2000) (claim of cycling between
tacit and codified knowledge); Reiffenstein, supra note 39, at 300.
42.
David & Foray, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting JACK GOODY, THE
DOMESTICATION OF THE SAVAGE MIND 143 (1977)).
Maurice Cassier, Appropriation and Commercialization of the Pasteur
43.
Anthrax Vaccine, 36 STUD. HiST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL Sel. 722, 737,
739 (2005); see also Paul A. David, Knowledge, Property, and the System Dynamics

of Technological Change, in PROCEEDINGS

OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE

at 215, 219-21 (L. Summers & S.
Shah eds., 1993).
44.
Cowan et al., supra note 28, at 211, 212, 226.
45.
David & Foray, supra note 10, at 26.
46.
See Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification
and the Diffusion of Knowledge, 6 INDuS. & CORP. CHANGE, 595, 603 (1997)
(explaining that the technology by which information is stored and managed changes
over time).
ON

DEVELOPMENT

ECONOMICS

1992,
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code is no longer manifest." 4 7 Cowan and others describe this as
"normal technology," positing that many knowledge communities rely
on a highly elaborate and codified knowledge base (shared jargon,
norms, specifications, and so on) that may be referenced only if and
when a dispute arises.8 This is a different situation (from a cost
perspective, for instance) than one in which the knowledge has never
been codified at all.
One example might be that the norms of scholarly citation take into
account what must be referenced explicitly and what can be taken for
granted as tacit or background knowledge." In the rarified world of
legal citation, we are bound by Bluebook format once we do decide to
cite to something, but many areas of discretion exist regarding if and
when to drop a footnote. After writing many law review articles, many
of us just "know it when we see it." If a dispute does arise over what
should be cited, we might refer to the enormous body of scholarly
literature for comparison-this could be thought of as an implicit,
displaced codebook that has been built up by custom. In contrast to the
situation of the displaced codebook, much knowledge that could be
codified simply is not. Even in the scholarly world, which of course is
heavily text oriented, examples include scholarly insights into a field
that may never result in publicationso or even diligent preparation for
classroom teaching that is never eventually taught or transmitted in any
way. Again, implicit in these examples is a cost factor-it may not be
worth the investment to codify the knowledge, even though it is surely
possible to do so.

47.
BERKELEY

Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1015 (2008) (citing Cowan et al., supra note 28, at

230-33).

Cowan et al., supranote 28, at 224.
48.
49.
Arthur S. Brisbane, Op-Ed., Scholarly Work, Without All the Footnotes,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at WK8 (discussing norms of attribution and citation in
journalism as opposed to scholarship, in response to controversy over Guy Deutscher's
article Does Your Language Shape How You Think?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010,
at MM42).

50.
Agrawal, supra note 39, at 78 ("To this end, it is interesting to speculate
about the broader policy implications of this study in terms of the practical application
of new knowledge generated from university research in general. It seems reasonable to
assert that the knowledge studied here is particularly applied relative to that generated
by university research overall, from disciplines such as biology, chemistry, and physics
as well as political science, sociology, and economics. It may, in fact, be even more
important to engage the researcher in the transfer of university knowledge more broadly
defined since the knowledge examined here was constructed from inventions that were
explicitly licensed with commercial intentions.").
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2. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
In Polanyi's original work and more sharply in recent research, an
essential aspect of sticky knowledge emerges in its social dimension.
Harry Collins describes what he calls weak (or relational) tacit
knowledge-that is, sticky knowledge that could be codified but is not,
for a variety of social reasons, including deliberate concealment or
mismatched saliences and the like." As an example of the first type of
sticky knowledge, scientists visiting other laboratories may find
answers to their questions that are not completely forthcoming.52 With
regard to mismatched saliences, Collins gives an example of a party to
a knowledge transfer assuming that the other party had access to an
essential piece of knowledge, which the second party in fact did not."
In the management literature, one finds references to "social
capital," including its most important relational component, trust.54 As
Jamie Collins and Michael Hitt define it:
Social capital has both a relational and a structural dimension.
This view is conceptually closely related to [the] assertion that
social capital involves elements of 'who you know', as well as
how one actor is connected to other actors in a network. The
existence of firm-level social capital involves relationships
between firms. 5
Structural relationships are indeed essential (for firms must be able
to connect with each other first in order to develop or capitalize upon
social capital). But these initial meta-level relationships may not be
sufficient to complete the knowledge transfer in the absence of
51.
52.
53.

COLLINS, supra note 8, at 91-97.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 95-96.

54.
See Collins & Hitt, supra note 39, at 148 ("Building relational capital
involves development of trust, information sharing and joint problem solving. The
inherently complex process of transferring tacit knowledge requires greater attention to
the relational dimension of social capital than does transferring other forms of
knowledge. In particular, tacit knowledge transfer requires greater trust between
partners than does explicit knowledge transfer." (citation omitted)); see also POLANYI,
supra note 1, at 61 ("Think of the amazing deployment of the infant mind. It is spurred
by a blaze of confidence, surmising the hidden meaning of speech and adult behavior.
This is how it grasps their meaning. And each new step can be achieved only by
entrusting oneself to this extent to a teacher or leader. . . . It appears then that

traditionalism, which requires us to believe before we know, and in order that we may
know, is based on a deeper insight into the nature of knowledge and of the
communication of knowledge than is a scientific rationalism that would permit us to
believe only explicit statements based on tangible data .. .
55.
Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
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individual-level relationships." As explored further in Part II, this
insight has many implications for knowledge governance of intellectualproperty-protected goods:
Knowledge reproduction has . .. long hinged on the 'master-

apprentice' system (where a young person's capacity is
moulded by watching, listening and imitating) or on
interpersonal transactions among members of the same
profession or community of practice. These means of
reproducing knowledge may remain at the heart of many
professions and traditions, but they can easily fail to operate
when social ties unravel . . . ."

In short, people and their relationships-including their quirks and their
ability to connect, as well as their possible disconnects-are critical for
knowledge diffusion.
Sticky knowledge is not just about connecting actors to a
knowledge network, but also about connecting them to knowledge that
resides in the larger collective. For lawyers or law professors, whose
profession famously hinges on risk analysis and subjective judgment
calls within a defined interpretative universe ("it depends"), this may
seem very familiar. A strongly social sticky knowledge depends on the
ability to respond to complex and nuanced signals from others, and
therefore can never be fully codifiable-what Harry Collins dubs Social
Cartesianism.59 This kind of sticky knowledge resides literally within
the body of the social.
Trust is integral to working with these stronger kinds of stickiness,
along with its essential characteristics of absorptive capacity and
cultural specificity. Effective social interactions contribute to the
development of trust, facilitating the knowledge transfer process. Due
to its inherently idiosyncratic nature, transfer of sticky knowledge is
likely to be most effective when the parties involved trust one another.
In fact, some have argued that trust is a prerequisite for sharing sticky

56.
Id. at 156.
57.
David & Foray, supranote 10, at 25.
Collins & Hitt, supra note 39, at 148; see also Antonelli, The Evolution of
58.
the IndustrialOrgamisation of the Production of Knowledge, 23 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON.
243 (1999). If institutional knowledge networks can be analogized to the structural
component of inter-firm networks in management literature, then the subsequent
relational dimension of sticky knowledge and its consequences for knowledge transfer
overall must be examined.
59.
COLLINs, supra note 8, at 125-26. He defines Social Cartesianism, where
"[t]he collectivity, rather than the individual, is the location of the knowledge."
Id. at 131.
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knowledge.' This is a foundational principle in trade secret law, much
of which is premised on the formation of confidential relationships."
Trust is a component that should be considered in relation to all sorts of
knowledge transmission and diffusion, including that associated
with copyright.
The ability to access sticky knowledge is contingent also on
specific social groups. This is a point about relative social power, but it
is also an observation about the different kinds of knowledge
susceptible to codification. There may be tremendous advantages to
codification in the area of medicine, where peer-to-peer transactions of
somewhat standardized knowledge increasingly occur, compared to the
area of education, where:
Curiously enough, however, teachers at the elementary and
secondary level, on the other hand, do not fit the template of
the modem knowledge-based communities, even though they
make intensive use of knowledge. There may be a massive
amount of innovation going on as individual instructors strive
to find solutions to their teaching problems, but, perhaps
because those problems involve working with 'unstandardised
materials', i.e. their students, relatively few of those
pedagogical innovations are passed on to, and shared by, the
rest of the community.
And much of the unconscious (sometimes thought of as intuitive or
non-rational) aspect of sticky knowledge is in the form of cultural
assumptions, background, experience, heuristics-what Jack Balkin has
termed cultural "memes" or "cultural software." 63 Thus another
component of sticky knowledge is "implicit"" -that is "the acquisition
of knowledge that takes place largely independently of conscious

60.

See, e.g., Collins & Hitt, supra note 39, at 159.

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (amended 1985)
61.
("'Improper means' includes . . . inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy
. . . ."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
62.
David & Foray, supra note 10, at 29; accord COLLINS, supra note 8, at
170 ("Education is socialization-it [is] the common learning of a language. Some of it
can be substituted by information transmission but when too much is substituted, it
becomes something else. Education, then, is always going to be inefficient. And, since
the Internet is a broadcast medium, it is not going to substitute for education.").
63.
See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SoFTwARE: A THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY (1998).
64.
Andrea Pozzali, Tacit Knowledge, Implicit Learning and Scientific
Reasoning, 7 MIND & Soc'Y 227 (2008).
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attempts to learn." 6 5 Concepts such as implicit bias or implicit social
cognition undergird all forms of sticky knowledge.'
In sum, sticky knowledge represents much more than simply the
un-codified characteristics of knowledge, although it is often described
by that surface quality. It consists of the attributes that are not only
constrained by the economics of information, but also integrally bound
up with social relations and the social collective such as absorptive
capacity and cultural specificity. Some kinds of sticky knowledge can
be easily encouraged along the continuum into more articulable or
explicit knowledge. Other kinds of sticky knowledge may be more
elusive or costly to codify because of the existence of implicit codes
(including displaced codebooks) within specific knowledge
communities, institutional arrangements and accompanying absorptive
capacities of these institutions (including their internal cultural
competencies), the degree of social capital (including trust) among
knowledge partners, the degree of standardization of knowledge within
specific social groups, and/or or the challenges associated with implicit
social cognition (including implicit bias). Altogether, these factors point
to a social construct of knowledge within a narrative of science shaped
as much by culture and situated perspectives as by facts on the
ground.6 Indeed, rather than simply a positive account of science
performed by individual knowledge seekers, Polanyi's view of this type
of knowledge was deeply grounded in its normative and immanent
function within specific intergenerational epistemic communities.
65.
ARTHUR S. REBER, IMPLICIT LEARNING AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY
ON THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS 5 (1993); see also Kang & Lane, supra note 24, at
467 (discussing this realm of decision-making, which sits at "the nexus of social
psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience" has evolved into a new
body of science called "implicit social cognition"). This not only applies to issues of
race, but to any significant social category, leading Kang and Lane to term the general
problem of not seeing one's own implicit bias "category blindness or category
agnosticism." Id. at 468 n.4.
See Kang & Lane, supra note 24, at 490-92 (discussing behavioral
66.
realism); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489 (2005)
(discussing how unconscious assumptions are often not made explicit except through
deliberate techniques of awareness, such as implicit bias tests, which can reveal aspects
such as racial animus).
67.
See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?
THINKING FROM WOMEN'S LIVEs (1991).
POLANYI, supra note 1, at 61 ("But if we know a great deal that we cannot
68.
tell, and if even that which we know and can tell is accepted by us as true only in view
of its bearing on a reality beyond it, a reality which may yet manifest itself in the future
in an indeterminate range of unsuspected results; if indeed we recognize a great
discovery, or else a great personality, as most real, owing to the wider range of its yet
unknown future manifestations: then the idea of knowledge based on wholly identifiable
grounds collapses, and we must conclude that the transmission of knowledge from one
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The food served in so-called "Korean taco trucks" illustrates some
of the social dimensions described above. This cuisine, which has its
genesis in Los Angeles and is furthered by the digital technology of
Twitter," is a fusion of Korean "kalbi" barbeque with Mexican tortillas
and toppings. o Many have recently noted that knowledge in some areas
of food innovation is governed more by social norms than by formal
intellectual property law." Despite the lack of formal or even informal
legal protection, however, this innovation has been slow to diffuse
throughout urban areas. Barriers to knowledge exchange lie partly in
sticky knowledge's interpersonal realm. Knowledge consumers require
the absorptive capacity to appreciate what the knowledge purveyor is
trying to convey, perhaps across two or more different cultures or
languages. Knowledge producers may be tasked with building consumer
trust around a culinary innovation, yet the experimental, still-evolving
recipes may not lend themselves to standardization within a more
familiar franchise system. And bias for hotdogs or other foods more
familiarly associated with trucks may abound. (Or it is possible that
these producers are guarding their recipes precisely through deliberate
stickiness, similar to trade secrets-discussed further in the next
Subsection.) While this is not a knowledge tragedy by any means, this
example can remind us (at least those who love both Korean and
Mexican food) of how sticky knowledge may prevent full knowledge
reliability or spillover.
B. Within IntellectualProperty
Intellectual property dwellers are generally familiar with the
concept of sticky knowledge but do not typically associate it with
generation to the other must be predominately tacit." (emphasis omitted and added));
see also POLANYI, supra note 1, at 244-45.

John T. Edge, The Tortilla Takes a Road Trip to Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July
69.
28, 2010, at Dl.
Id. ("Granted, Koreans have long eaten kalbi wrapped in lettuce leaves, in
70.
a taco-like fashion. But it's a 21st-century paradox that Korean food, still considered
exotic by many Americans, has begun to gain widespread acceptance, when wrapped in
a Mexican flatbread and topped with taco truck embellishments.").
Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Who Owns the Korean Taco?, N.Y
71.
http://freakonomics.
10:30 AM),
(July 2, 2010,
TIMES FREAKONOMICS
a copyright
("From
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/who-owns-the-korean-taco/
perspective, cuisine is a lot like fashion. Recipes are unprotected by copyright, and so
anyone can copy another's recipe. Actual dishes-the 'built food' you order in a
restaurant-can also be copied freely. And as anyone who has eaten a molten chocolate
cake or miso-glazed black cod knows, popular and innovative dishes do seem to
migrate from restaurant to restaurant. The bottom line is that almost anything creative a
chef does-short of writing the menu, which is protected by law-can be copied by
another chef.").
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copyright. The stickiness of such knowledge is something that can be
used in a deliberate way to ensure that it is not diffused or that it is
diffused only under controlled conditions such as the licensing of
inventions. The sticky knowledge associated with the Pasteur anthrax
vaccine (despite the absence of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in
France in the nineteenth century), for instance, ensured in some cases
that this knowledge was not disseminated at all unless the actual person
(scientist) wanting access agreed to stay at the Pasteur Institute itself
where this vaccine was prepared.72 This technique of preserving
monopolistic control over technology is well known of course to
modem-day patent lawyers who often draft patent claims in ways that
do not reveal the underlying "know-how" that is required to practice
the invention-sticky knowledge that may be in the minds and hands of
the original inventor(s) or their collaborator(s). What is startling is how
little we have explored sticky knowledge in copyright (the realm of
expressive activity, manifested through civic, creative, cultural, and
educational forms of knowledge) compared to areas such as patent and
trade secret law (the realm of inventive activity)."
Interestingly, scholars outside the field of intellectual property law
generated the early socio-legal work that compared innovation capacity
generated by Silicon Valley as opposed to Boston's Route 128.74
Shubha Ghosh recently extended their insights to the international
realm. Others such as Catherine Fisk have focused on factors that
contribute to employee loyalty and/or mobility in the context of trade
secret protection. Ronald Gilson describes employee tacit knowledge
72.
See Cassier, supra note 43, at 737 (discussing a production and
distribution model proposed by Pasteur that represented a maximum concentration of
production and knowledge at one central location).
See Arora, supra note 5, at 43-46; see also James Bessen, Patentsand the
73.
Diffusion of Technical Information, 86 ECON. LETTERS 121 (2005).
74.
SAXENIAN, supra note 14, at 29-58; Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High Technology IndustrialDistricts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
75.
See Shubha Ghosh, Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal
Criminal Trade Secret Law, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 24 (2009); see also
ANNALEE SAXENIEN,
ECONOMY (2006).

THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A GLOBAL

76.
See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New
Economy, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 839, 863 (2005); trica Gorga & Michael
Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123, 1187 (2007); see
also Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest: Patents on Wall Street, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 116 (Donatella Porrini &
Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., 2007) (discussing tacit knowledge in the context of
securitization of assets such as intellectual property); Alan Hyde, Intellectual Property
Justifications for Restricting Employee Mobility: A Critical Appraisal in Light of the
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as "skill or expertise, as opposed to easily codifiable information, that
employees acquire through experience."" Others similarly indirectly
contrast it to codified knowledge.7 8
Many of these studies interrogate the methods of binding sticky
knowledge to an institution or encouraging its diffusion. In the context
of firm-based knowledge governance, for example, trica Gorga and
Michael Halberstam regard intellectual property and contracts as two
mechanisms to manage the two major problems associated with sticky
knowledge: leakage (through employee departures) and hoarding
(through employee unwillingness to share).7 ' Firms relying on sticky
knowledge are vulnerable to individual employee (or perhaps, in the
university context, graduate research assistant) actions rather than to the
public-goods problem associated with codification techniques more
familiar to intellectual property scholars.
Thus, the central question in many of these accounts becomes:
what measures should be taken to incentivize employees to either
remain with or leave a firm, and/or disclose their sticky knowledge
appropriately and fully in order to encourage optimal innovation where
tentative evidence suggests a policy in favor of "mobility of workers
and of spillover-inducing information"? ' In this sense, while their
definitions of sticky knowledge may be narrow (excluding a more
explicit consideration of the social dimension), the conclusions from
these studies often implicitly point to a view of sticky knowledge that
focuses on optimal social relations and institutions-albeit focusing on

Economic Evidence (Rutgers L. Sch.-Newark, Research Papers Series, Paper No. 070,
2010), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1630536.
Gilson, supra note 74, at 577 n.10; accordHyde, supra note 76.
77.
Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 76, at 1144 ("[T]he degree to which
78.
knowledge has been articulated, codified, or standardized on the one hand, and the
degree to which it is tacit or unarticulated, uncodified, or unstandardized on the other.
The distinction has been put in different ways. A prime example of tacit knowledge is
an individual skill, such as a local pilot's ability to safely bring a ship into the harbor
and to its berth .

. .

. This 'know-how' supercedes [sic] the general rules of navigation

and cannot be codified or standardized, but depends upon sense and long experience
working within a particular local context."); see also Burk, supra note 47, at 1012-16
(citing Cowan & Foray, supra note 46); Michael Madison, Beyond Creativity:
Copynight as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 820-22 (2010);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of Research Mateials and Tacit
Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 85, 97, 102-05 (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010) (citing Cowan et al., supra note 28).
79.
Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 76, at 1149; cf Arora, supra note 5, at
41-42 (arguing that binding sticky knowledge to a patent may protect licensing
parties-interfirm knowledge exchange partners-against opportunistic behavior).
Ghosh, supranote 75, at 35.
80.
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the firm or the university as the privileged unit of analysis."' Because
these scholars operate in the realm of trade secrecy and employee nondisclosure agreements (or non-competes), they also frequently invert
the typical assumption of Arrow's information-disclosure paradox: that
is, the problem is that knowledge is not easily disclosed.
Burk, Strandburg, and Bessen have each recently linked sticky
knowledge to patent law.82 The former two view it primarily as a
barrier to knowledge reliability and spillovers whereas Bessen argues
that it may facilitate knowledge exchange." For example, Strandburg
focuses on its role in user-innovation norms, including the realm of
academic research.' She suggests mechanisms both to encourage
diffusion and codification of sticky knowledge within these research
communities, including standardized equipment, protocol and/or tools,
in addition to circulating scientists among laboratories.8 By contrast,
Bessen describes how "some technologies follow a sort of life cycle of
technical

knowledge.

In

the

early

stage

...

knowledge

is

communicated via costly personal instruction, making geographic
localization, social networks, employee mobility and migration
important and competition between new technology firms soft." 86 In
these accounts, sticky knowledge may either impede or encourage
technical-knowledge exchange required for optimal inventive activity.
Turning to copyright specifically, how might we expand our
understanding of the various functions of sticky knowledge so as to
encourage long-term dynamic effect on creativity and learning? That
the social dimension of knowledge shapes cultural products incentivized
by copyright should not come as a surprise, but where do we locate its
sticky knowledge relative to other forms of intellectual property? Burk
has drawn a parallel between copyright and trade secret, claiming that
81.
For example, Gorga and Halberstam, as well as Fisk, conclude that
employee stock options have served to bind employee loyalty in the absence of noncompete agreements or other legally enforceable mechanisms. See Fisk, supra note 76,
at 844-46; Gorga & Halberstam, supranote 76, at 1187-92.
82.
See Bessen, supra note 5, at 5; Burk, supra note 47, at 1015; Strandburg,
supra note 78, at 97, 102-05; Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community
Norns: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2237 (2009).
83.
Burk, supra note 47, at 1021-28; see also id. at 1016-17 (documenting
how and where tacit knowledge may need to be made more explicit in patent law, such
as in disclosure provisions or in the cataloguing of relevant prior art).
84.
Strandburg, supra note 78, at 97.
85.
Id. at 102-04.
86.
Bessen, supra note 5, at 4 ("In later stages . . . knowledge is formalized,
teaching relies more on formal instruction, markets can more readily emerge for
general human capital and the interactions between new technology firms are
more strategic.").
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they both allow relevant actors to choose between appropriability
through disclosure or secrecy (in the case of copyright, through nonpublication). But the sticky knowledge surrounding copyright may be
the inadvertent result of social relations, rather than a conscious choice.
Sticky knowledge affects the "Progress of Science" 88 or knowledge
overall as well as copyright's function as an "engine of free
expression."" Unlike the patent and trade secret realms, the potential
for sticky knowledge to increase positive knowledge reliability and
spillovers is unexplored. Part II sketches a preliminary framework for
sticky knowledge and copyright.
II. COPYRIGHT
Embedded within copyright law are many assumptions about the

creative process and cultural activity.' These include ignoring the
significance of sticky knowledge as a factor in its own right and, in
particular, its social dimensions. Once a work is created (and possibly
protected by copyright), sticky knowledge can encourage or impede
knowledge diffusion. They also impact the reliability of knowledge,
which is something that patent scholars worry about in a different way
(inventions must demonstrate utility in order to obtain protection).

Reliability is also important in copyright, especially in regard to civic
and educational expression, and in the increasingly contentious digital87.
Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REv. 575, 607 ("[Ilt is interesting to note that copyright is the form of intellectual
property most compatible with parallel trade secrecy. Whereas the patent applicant must
make an election, choosing between maintaining the invention as a trade secret or
disclosing it to the public in return for patent protection, owners of copyright need not
make such an election. Copyright attaches at the moment that the original, intellectual
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, regardless of whether the work is
ever published. Indeed, unpublished works may receive some additional protective
consideration under copyright, as the choice of when to release the work to the public is
an important right to be reserved to the copyright holder. Copyright thus creates some
degree of incentive for disclosure, but can operate in situations where appropriability
concerns militate in favor of confidentiality. In other words, copyright occupies an
intermediate position between the disclosure regime of patent exclusivity and the
misappropriation regime of trade secrecy.").
88.
U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 8.
89.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985).
90.
See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP, 59 STAN. L. REv. 257, 259-61 (2006);
see also MADHAVI SUNDER, IP (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author); see also Julie
E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW

121 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Julie E. Cohen, Creativityand
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1151, 1151-54 (2007).
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information environment in which we find ourselves." A deeper
understanding of sticky knowledge inevitably leads to the conclusion
that knowledge reliability and knowledge spillovers are not friction
free.' They must always contend, for example, with issues of
absorptive capacity and trust associated with people interacting with
each other.
Some theorists have begun to articulate these social dimensions,
including largely invisible social-capital issues, within what might be
called an incipient governance analysis of copyright. For example, Julie
Cohen has described "the situated user," the figure within a particular
social matrix through which copyright must do its magic," and
articulates in detail a "networked self' through which a cultural matrix
embedded within a technical architecture manifests himself or herself.94
Similarly, Madhavi Sunder is developing a theory of "fair culture,"
which seeks a role for law in promoting equal capacity to meaningfully
participate in making . ..

culture.

. .

. [and where]

participatory

culture is normatively valuable in its own right."" Others are
generating accounts of copyright that focus on the "user" in "usergenerated content"-as opposed to the supply-side stories of
copyright.96 Many of these theories valorize the role of (for lack of a
better term) the copyright "user." By contrast, an active knowledge
exchange posits various participants in a creative cultural and learning
environment, where each might be systematically and structurally
impacted by social disconnects, whether through lack of social capital,
absence of trust, presence of implicit bias, or other dimensions of sticky

91.
Cf Sonia K. Katyal, Filtering,Piracy Surveillance and Disobedience, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 401, 402-03 (2009) (extolling the virtues of semiotic democracy).
92.
Antonelli, supra note 35, at 250 ("Articulable knowledge consists of a mix
of tacit and codified knowledge and it can be considered a step in a process of
codification. As such it exhibits intermediate conditions of appropriability. In such
conditions knowledge spillovers are possible but require substantial efforts to be
absorbed by perspective users.").
93.
Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copynght Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 347, 349 (2005).
94.
Cohen, supra note 25; see also COHEN, supra note 27.
95.
SUNDER, supra note 90.
96.
See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual
Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 431, 433 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, I
Put You There: User-GeneratedContent and Anticircumvention, 12 VAND. J. ENT. &
TEcH. L. 889, 891-94 (2010). Madison, while not identifying a figure as such, has
recently addressed what he has called the "pattern-oriented approach to fair use."
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1525, 1684-86 (2004).
97.
See, Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1871,
1878 (2007).
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knowledge." By recognizing the salience of sticky knowledge, we
might begin to understand when and where it might benefit from
mechanisms to enhance disclosure and promote "savoir" between
knowledge exchange partners, through copyright or other means.
Underlying these concerns is a governance question: what kinds of
social arrangements, institutions, and/or mechanisms will facilitate (or
stymie) knowledge reliability and knowledge diffusion?' Various
governance modalities can be deployed to address these social
relationships within knowledge networks to address the relationship of
sticky knowledge to explicit knowledge." In the corporate law context,
for example, a literature on firm-based knowledge governance is
emerging-drawing from knowledge economics and management; it is
beginning to link the boundaries of the firm to "the special nature of
knowledge resources."'' Understanding sticky knowledge opens up
many possibilities, including a sense of where social relations may pose
a limit to the transcendental or formalist legal framework in copyright.
Analogously, as Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg have written
regarding the cultural commons in intellectual property:
Experience constitutes an important intellectual resource that
simultaneously relates human beings to their inherited and
evolving environment(s) and constitutes a resource that may
shape the intellectualenvironment. Experience (or perception
or observation) is not enclosed within IP regimes except when
expressed and embodied in a particular qualifying form, such
Kang & Lane, supra note 24, at 514-17 ("In another study with similar
98.
methodology, undergraduates were willing to trade away $3249 (22 percent of the
salary range of options) to work for a man instead of a woman.").
Cf Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial
99.
Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. REv. XX. Moreover, sticky knowledge is
highly relevant for institutional knowledge producers in educational spaces, whether
operating within firms, NPOs (such as universities), NGOs, specific cultural commons,
or as "users" in the UGC context.
100. Antonelli, supra note 35, at 229 (suggesting three governance mechanisms
from a knowledge-economics framework: quasi-hierarchies, coordinated transactions,
and constructed interactions).
Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 76, at 1125; see also Burk &
101.
McDonnell, supra note 87; Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 431, 499 (2009) ("The 'short and remarkably imprecise' contracts of
the Japanese style, when braided with a governance process that supports mutual
learning, become a regime that generates quite precise expectations and obligations.
The tacit knowledge of innovation, often held to require the carefully controlled
environment of the firm, is made explicit enough to be reviewed across organizational
boundaries (even if it is far from being fully formalized) and thereby opens an entity to
cutting-edge technology lodged in other entities." (footnote omitted)).
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as a copyrightable work of authorship or a patentable
invention. "

Sticky knowledge issues associated with copyrighted works may be
somewhat intractable or hidden. For example, the trust issues critical
for reliable knowledge (as opposed to mere content) transmission are
still in flux along digital networks. The veritable explosion of
copyrighted information created by and through digital technologies
through Internet intermediaries still contends with the stickiness of
knowledge and the accompanying challenges posed by social relations,
absorptive capacities, and institutional frameworks. Whether digital or
print, the social capital in the form of mentoring and social networking
required to produce certain kinds of elaborate cultural worksparticularly the ones easily monetized through copyright, not the ones
simply protected by copyright-is much more extensive than we
candidly admit." Trust is an important component of cultural
exchange, and it can be breached through uneven power dynamics
between the exchanging parties. As Sunder has pointed out, free flow
of knowledge is not equivalent to fair flow."
As described earlier, copyright is only one of many modalities of
knowledge governance and is itself composed of numerous policy
levers. " On the most reductionist level, it is a market-based
mechanism for incentivizing creative "works" through the assignment
of exclusive rights to an author upon the satisfaction of certain
threshold statutory requirements. Copyright's public-law frameworkas a proportion of the overall regulatory landscape-has shifted rapidly
since the advent of digital-networked technology to one that must
accommodate regulatory mechanisms via ancillary private-ordering
mechanisms such as licenses, terms of service or other contractual
102. Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Constructing Commons in the CulturalEnvironment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 657, 685
(2010) (emphasis added).
103. See Collins & Hitt, supra note 39, at 151 (describing the impact of
externships on tacit knowledge transmission in the film industry). Writer Kazuo
Ishiguru and filmmaker Alex Garland are neighbors who meet regularly to talk about
their work, which led to collaboration on the film Never Let Me Go. Moira
MacDonald, Film Is Bonus of a FelicitousFriendship, SEATTLE TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2010, at
Hi; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 1449-56 (suggesting that social structure,
leadership and human capital, and industry maturity are all factors that drive open
innovation, in addition to dependence in IP rights).
104. Madhavi Sunder, Bollywood/Hollywood, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
275, 276-78 (2011), http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol12/issl/artl0/ (discussing
the similarity between Satyajit Ray's The Alien and Steven Spielberg's E.T. The ExtraTerrestrial(Universal Pictures 1982)).
105. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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arrangements,'" social norms,"o7 technical protection measures,tos or
even aggressive structural class-action lawsuits such as the Google
Book Search litigation,"
and through digital intermediaries
generally. 1 o Indeed, cyberlaw theorists have long relied upon a
governance set piece suggested by Lawrence Lessig consisting of
markets, norms, law, and (technical) architecture, also known as
"code."" 1 Through its market-based provision of knowledge, copyright
is also much more deeply implicated in First Amendment values than
other areas of intellectual property.112 As an alternate source to stateprovided content, copyright is not immune, however, to issues of
market control and consequent de facto censorship." 3 There are other
issues with alternative forms of governance, which are beyond the
scope of this Article.114
In this context, what roles does sticky knowledge play? Some
possibilities are illustrated below with respect to works completely
encased by copyright's exclusive rights, works produced through open
innovation methods, and works in the public domain. For each of these
three categories within copyright's penumbra, I provide two suggestive
examples.

106.
THEORETICAL

See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Tailoring Copyight to Social Production, 12
INQUIRES

L.

309

(2011),

http://www.bepress.com/til/default/

voll2/issl/art11/.

107. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Using SocialNorms to Regulate FanFiction
and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1869, 1874-80 (2009).
108. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entn't, Inc., No. 09-15932,
2010 WL 5141269, at *1, *5-6 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2010).

109. Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyight Reform,
2011 Wis. L. REv 479 (describing the quasi-legislative nature of the proposed
settlement, including provisions that would allow massive private ordering of what is
typically allocated to public-law decision-making); see also See Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC, slip op. at 1, 29 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (order
rejecting proposed settlement).
110. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81
TEMP. L. REv. 67 (2008) (examining the role of service providers and software makers
in the decision to terminate or deny access to people's digital property).
111.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 123-25 (2006).
112.
See generallyNEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008).
113. See generally DAvID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTHE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009).
114. See, e.g., Chon, supra note 27, at 374-76 (addressing challenges such as
fragmentation, policy incoherence, and relative lack of due process); COHEN, supra note
27 (exploring the ways in which social practices of information use are mediated
by context).
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A. Copyrght

According to standard economic accounts, works protected by
copyright's public-law framework are codified and thus become the
objects of exclusive rights, which can then be transacted in a market.
This assumes that copyright incentivizes the creation of knowledge,
although much recent scholarly work has demonstrated that social
norms,"' intrinsic satisfaction,"' or industry structure"' can be as
powerful motivators as copyright. Regardless, numerous transaction
costs and market failures associated with sticky knowledge exist within
the standard narrative. Of course, some copyright doctrines facilitate
the expression of sticky knowledge. These may include cover licenses
that allow bands to play music-thereby facilitating the dissemination of
musicti-or fair use for educational purposes, book reviews, and the

like.119
This Section briefly examines two such market failures: licensing
of orphan works and of derivative works. Let's say the rights holder
cannot be located-the so-called orphan-works issue. 120 Stickiness
characterizes this knowledge exchange: the author is missing (literally a
social disconnect) and codification in the form of a Copyright Office
registration of ownership and assignments is unavailable. The
administrability of the 1976 Copyright Act is hampered by a major
communication failure between potential knowledge-exchange partners.
By contrast, the Creative Commons license might be viewed as an
example of a governance alternative to licensing under the Copyright
Act. 121 Perhaps most saliently for purposes of sticky knowledge, it
assumes more readily that authors move around or die and that many
people (whether licensors or licensees) are not situated to engage in
115. See Hetcher, supranote 107, at 1887-91.
116. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 11-22 (2010) (describing "The Intrinsic
Dimension of Human Creativity"); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as
Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 29 (2011),
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol12/iss1/art3/.
117. Dreyfuss, supranote 4, at 1449-56.
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical
118.
works: Compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords).
§ 107 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use).
119.
120. See, e.g., Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008);
Marybeth Peters, The lmportance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE - ORPHAN WORKS (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/.
121.
Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons as ConversationalCopyright, in
1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES INTHE
DIGITAL AGE 445-48, (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); About, CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
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negotiations after the initial licensing choice. Whether within the public
law or Creative Commons regimes, design features either inadvertently
or explicitly take into account the dynamic flux of social relations.
As some of the leading theorists of sticky knowledge have
observed, tacit knowledge defies attempts at being "expressed in a
particular language."l 22 Thus even though a book is fixed (codified) and
its rights-owner located, it may not be comprehensible to an audience
due to language and other issues of absorptive capacity. This is a
paradigmatic example of strong stickiness (cost-distance) due to social
relations-language may be the strongest form of stickiness. Indeed the
first exclusive right provided by the Berne Convention in 1886 was the
translation rightl 23 -no doubt, to increase the stickiness (non-disclosure
unless through licensing) of knowledge through copyright.124
The translation example can be extrapolated to other derivative
works, such as the adaptation of movies from books, which may be a
question of the "best mode," analogous to patent law. Knowledge
spillovers created by moving from text to visual and oral learning, or
combining both, can be tremendous. For example, literacy rates in
India have jumped due to Bollywood subtitles. 125 Recognizing stickiness
might help policymakers recognize exceptions to the adaption or
derivative-work right (or a narrower scope to the right or perhaps
forms of compulsory licensing) where dissemination of the work might
be of high value. Understanding sticky knowledge in this way might
help us to re-conceptualize other issues of translations, such as those for
the visually impaired.12 6 In that regard as well, it is interesting to note
that one major aspect of the proposed Google Book Search settlement
was the freedom of Google to make non-display uses of the works,
including improving its automated translation tools. 127 Although this
apparently was not been a hot-button issue, it is a salutary aspect from
the point of view of anyone who cares about the high transaction costs
of derivative works generally and translations in particular. One might
imagine a copyright analogy to the generics industries in
pharmaceutical patent law, where the social dimensions of knowledge
122. David & Foray, supranote 10, at 25.
123. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
12, Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27. The reproduction right, on the other
hand, was only added with the Stockholm revision of 1967.
124. Id. art. 9; DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 175-76 (2006).
125. Music Videos Expand Literacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at WK2.
126. Meeting the Needs of Visually Impaired Persons: What Challenges for
http://www.wipo.
ORGANIZATION,
PROPERTY
INTELLECTUAL
WORLD
IP?,
int/meetings/en/2009/vip gel.
127. Samuelson, supranote 109, at 27-28.
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exchange might be mitigated by facilitating export markets to or from
emerging economies such as India (that has an English-language base in
addition to its many indigenous languages).
B. Open Innovation
Some works are partially protected by copyright but are
characterized by governance structures that are often heralded as
"open. " Their underlying standards, or other characteristics, allow
many people, regardless of their social position, to participate in the
creative community with fewer transaction costs and greater dynamic
impact than works fully protected by copyright.' Nonetheless, sticky
knowledge can operate even in this context, and this Section will
provide two specific examples to make the point.
In the context of digital-networked content, it is almost banal now
to observe that knowledge goods are often generated without full-bore
intellectual property protection.' 29 As Benkler explains, open source
software is defined as:
[A]n approach to software development that is based on
shared effort on a nonproprietary model. It depends on many
individuals contributing to a common project, with a variety
of motivations, and sharing their respective contributions
without any single person or entity asserting rights to exclude
either from the contributed components or from the resulting
whole. 13 0
Among the vaunted qualities of open source is that it allows many
different contributors to work together in a distributed peer-production
model. This suggests many tantalizing possibilities for the education
sector,131 as well as other areas such as agricultural biotechnology.1 32 It
128. See Steven Johnson, Innovation: It Isn't a Matter of Left or Right, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at BU7.
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
129.
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 68-75 (2006).
130. Id. at 63.
131.
See, e.g., The Literacy Project, GOOGLE, http://www.google.
com/literacy/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011); MIT to Make Nearly All Course Materials
Available Free on the World Wide Web, MIT NEWS (April 4, 2001),
Open
Educational
UNESCO,
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2001/ocw.htn;
Resources: Open Content for Higher Education, THE VIRTUAL UNIVERSITY AND ELEARNING, http://www.unesco.org/iiep/virtualuniversity/forumshome.php?queryforums
id=3 (last visited February 5, 2011); see also Frequently Asked Questions About the
Million Book
Project,
CARNEGIE
MELLON
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARIES,
http://briel.library.cmu.edu/Libraries/MBPFAQ.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). The
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generally operates to maximize knowledge diffusion. That is, open
source facilitates knowledge spillovers after becoming codified and may
also encourage reliability through disclosure (many eyes make all bugs
shallow). It has also generated new copyright mechanisms that
encourage broad dissemination of works, such as the GNU General
Public License. This is also a narrative of new governance in which
self-governing non-state actors (in the form of the GNU/Linux
community, etc.) purportedly took control of innovation, rather than
relying on either the market or the state.133
Sticky knowledge has also played less of an overt role in this opensource story. However, in a recent study of a deliberate collaboration
between open-source software projects and firms with embedded
proprietary approaches, Siobhin O'Mahony and Beth Bechky show that
identifying converging and diverging interests was a key factor in the
success of producing more accessible user interfaces.1 34 The
collaboration began with the insight by open-source community groups
that existing user interfaces were not easily accessible to those with a
non-technical background.13 ' By contrast, commercial collaborators
wanted to leverage open source code in commercial markets.136
Through what sociologists of science call "boundary organizations,"1 37
parties negotiated over four domains including "governance,
membership, ownership [including intellectual property], and control
over production." 38 Among the governance issues that needed to be
negotiated were project representation, control, and structure.1 39 These
are all paradigmatically issues around social relations, which
surrounded the more detectable knowledge good. Resolution of these
issues was a pre-requisite to successful knowledge transfer.
Carnegie-Mellon University's Million Book Project is a project where books are
scanned to supplement libraries in developing countries. Id.
132. See Keith Aoki, "Free Seeds, Not Free Beer": ParticipatoryPlant
Breeding, Open Source Seeds, and Acknowledging User Innovation in Agriculture, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 2275, 2300 (2009).
133. But see Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 1448-53 (commenting on the
dependence of open innovation upon IP); Janet Hope, Dianne Nicol & John
Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, Business Models and the Knowledge Economy, in
REGULATORY CAPITALISM: How IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER 109
(John Braitwaite ed., 2008).
134. Siobhdn O'Mahony & Beth A. Bechky, Boundary Organizations:Enabling
CollaborationAmong Unexpected Allies, 53 ADMIN. Sci. Q., 422, 432-33 (2008).
135. Id. at 433.
136. Id. at 441.
137. Id. at 426. These "facilitate collaboration between scientists and nonscientists by remaining accountable to both." Id.
138. Id. at 432, 441.
139. Id. at 437-41.
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A second example involves the open standard, defined as "a
specification that is publicly available and freely implementable. "'4
Examples of open standards include the transmission protocols such as
FTP, the language of Web pages (HTML), and the image
format (PNG).
When standards are open and freely available, it becomes
possible for anyone to develop an interoperable
implementation. This reduces the ability of vendors to tie a
standard to the purchase of other products, i.e., vendor lockin. This in turn facilitates multiple interoperable
implementations, thus providing users with choice. Choice
typically brings with it lower costs and technological
variation. 141
Rajiv Shah and Jay Kesan have described how the adoption of
open source software through open standards by the state of
Massachusetts in the absence of multiple vendors resulted in a lock-in
that was no different from the adoption of proprietary software and
proprietary standards. They conclude that "other governments
considering open standard policies should incorporate a 'running code'
requirement before adopting an open standard." 42 Running code refers
to "the existence of multiple interoperable implementations of an open
standard" by at least two different vendors.' 43 Code that is truly
interoperable depends on specifications that require negotiation by
different firms even if they are compatible with the same (theoretically
open) standard. Again, before successful knowledge transfer, a certain
minimal level of arms-length communication had to occur.
What these two examples suggest implicitly but strongly is that the
sticky knowledge-the social knowledge and relationships within and
140. Rajiv Shah & Jay Kesan, Running Code as Part of an Open Standards
1, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
Policy, 14 FIRST MONDAY
index.php/fm/issue/view/291.
141. Id. (citing Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, INFORMATION RULES: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 103-08 (1999) (citation omitted)).
142. Id.
143. Id. ("Open standards are often conflated with 'open source', but they are
very different. Open source is a development model for software based on the public
availability of the source code. While open source software typically relies upon and
uses open standards, it should not be conflated with open standards. Open standards can
also be incorporated into software developed through other development models, such
as proprietary software."); see also DAVID G. POST, INSEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE:
NOTES ON THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE (2009) (describing running code in the context of
IETF's specification of TCP/IP).
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between multiple social actors-is needed to bolster and maximize the
long-term dynamic effect of knowledge within open-innovation models.
The negotiation of differing governance structures, including social
relationships and other sticky dimensions, is essential. Without this,
knowledge can be less reliable or less capable of positive
spillover effects.
C. Public Domain
Public domain works are completely unprotected by copyright, for
many different reasons." One way to view these works is that they
may be the least sticky of all because they are theoretically free from
any need for any formal economic transactions within a market-based
system of knowledge governance. However, these works also may be
associated with some of the stickiest forms of knowledge-knowledge
that is deeply inflected with absorptive capacity or social cognitionand may be why these works are in the public domain. What, if
anything, could be done, to encourage reliability-that is, appropriate
attribution and authenticity-as well as dissemination and/or disclosure
of these works?
One recent example that implicates both domains of copyright and
traditional cultural expression is the Deep Forest band. Not only did
this band remix music from the Solomon Islands without proper and
complete attribution to the original musicians' 45-thus stripping the
original music of much of its cultural significance-but the music can
be found now in all sorts of variations on information intermediaries,
such as YouTube, set to exotic visual imagery that is an ethnic mash-up
bearing no resemblance to any known tribal culture or form.1" While
all of these remixes are creative, as per copyright's mandate, they are
also arguably disrespectful to the original musicians and their cultural
heritage. The mostly northern consumers of these music videos also
continue to be mostly unenlightened about the nature of what they are
hearing and seeing so far from the original sources (the cost-distance
aspect of sticky knowledge).14 7
144. See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55
DUKE L.J. 783 (2006).
145. Antony Taubman has documented how the Deep Forest CD was drawn
from a UNESCO heritage recording. See PowerPoint presented by Antony Taubman
for the World Bank Distance Learning Course on Indigenous Knowledge, Traditional
Knowledge, Traditional Creativity and Cultural Expressions: What Role for IP? (March
31, 2005) (notes on file with author).
146. Any search of "Deep Forest YouTube" will validate this statement.
147. Although this Article will not address this phenomenon in detail, mash-ups
include the unsubstantiated "news" circling through various communities on the
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A final example spans both the open-innovation category and the
public-domain category and draws from Wikipedia, which has been
lauded as a source of knowledge that is at least equivalent to if not
superior to standard-print encyclopedic texts.1 It is increasingly
obvious that Wikipedia entries, while perhaps technically correct and
increasingly wide ranging, continue to reflect various social biases of
the peer-production community that contributes to them. The author
community is skewed towards a heavily young and male
demographic.' 49 As of the date of this writing, for example, the lawyer
Lutie Lytle has no Wikipedia entry. According to other sources,
including other peer-produced sources, she was one of the first AfricanAmerican female lawyers admitted to a bar in the United States and is
reputed to be the first African-American female law teacher." The
anonymity of Wikipedia authorship, in contrast to the intentional
author-attribution choices made by other peer-produced wikis such as
BlackPast.org, may lead to very different kinds of knowledge
production. Specialized knowledge such as the history of people of
African ancestry might be better organized this way, because nonanonymous wikis can build on trust and social capital within specific
ethnic and racial communities. At the same time, French-language
Wikipedia authors are the original source of scarce information on
Amadou Hampit6 BA, whose work remains largely untranslated into
English."' These examples illustrate how sticky knowledge influences
pathways in the production of apparently neutral texts. Absorptive
capacity, implicit bias, social capital and trust all influence who
participates in the production of knowledge in this medium and what
they know.
The public-domain examples caution us to take into account social
norms that may prevent us from identifying the kinds of knowledge that
are easily codified through dominant mechanisms, but nevertheless
remain "tacit." What are the social relations underlying these norms of
Internet, resulting in inaccurate information such as President Obama's religious
affiliation. See, e.g., Bryan Adamson, The Muslim Manchurian Candidate: Barack
Obama, Rumors, and Quotidian Hermeneutics, 24 St. John's J. Legal Commentary
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1666492 (last visited Feb. 6,
2011).
148. BENKLER, supranote 129, at 70-74, 280-89.

149.

See Noam Cohen, Define Gender Gap? Look Up Wikipedia's Contributor

List, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2011, at Al (finding that 13 percent of contributors were
women; the average age of the contributors is in the mid-twenties).
150. Lytle,
Lutie
(1875-?),
contributed
by
Elwood
Watson,
http://www.blackpast.org/?q=aah/lytle-lutie-1875; see also Lutie Lyde: The Tdird

Woman Lawyer, THE ROBINSON LIBRARY, http://www.
robinsonlibrary.com/law/unitedstates/history/lytle.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
151. See supra note 2.

Afican-American
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silence and what kinds of institutional mechanisms can be brought to
bear to foster greater clarification?
III. KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
How can knowledge-governance frameworks support greater
reliability and spillovers of knowledge to further copyright's goal of
encouraging learning over the long-term? Because sticky knowledge
permeates all possible domains of copyright and indeed all of
intellectual property, the observations here are necessarily partial and
and
sticky knowledge,
copyright,
preliminary.' 52
Where
intergenerational equity come together is aptly described by the concept
of trading zones, which sociologists of science describe as "emergent,
provisional spaces in which disparate communities meet and
temporarily coordinate their activities.""' These fluid and luminal
governance spaces suggest tension among various vectors, including the
static inefficiencies and dynamic efficiencies generated by copyright,
the on-going structural inequalities in access to resources and
representation, as well as the intergenerational consequences of all of
the above.
If we construe governance mechanisms broadly, we can create
intra- and inter-firm market incentives or social norms as well as other
ways to encourage knowledge transmission through institutional
mechanisms, of course including public-law reform. But as Antonelli
writes, "[k]nowledge interactions, as distinct from transactions, [are]
. . . the product of intentional action directed to make knowledge

communication possible."' 54 Many of the social qualities of sticky
knowledge require attention to this intentionality, including its critical
ingredient of trust.
With respect to copyright, one often assumes that creating content
is enough to convey knowledge, and to assume away the problem of
sticky knowledge. The previous Sections have shown that all
knowledge goods still have some residue of the social, or perhaps even
parochial, although it is more commonplace to extol the trends of
globalization and hybridity as well as the ease of access provided by
digital-networked technology. 1 By focusing on sticky knowledge, the
social and institutional arrangements around knowledge goods may be
152. Similarly, Katherine Strandburg has examined its function primarily in the
specific context of academic research, patents, and user innovation. Strandburg, supra
note 78, at 97, 102-05.
153. O'Mahony & Bechky, supranote 134, at 453 (2008).
154. Antonelli, supra note 35, at 228.
155. POST, supra note 143, at 31-46 (describing the geometric growth of
the Internet).
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analyzed through the lens of what has recently been termed global
governance, revealing implications for intergenerational equity.
Defined recently as "organized efforts to manage the course of events
in a social system,"1 16 among the chief characteristics of newer
governance approaches are the greater interaction among public,
private, and civil society sectors, which intersect and manage the
course of social events.157 Whether termed co-regulation,' global
governance by information," intersystemic
administrative law,'
governance,"' multi-stakeholder governance,162 new governance,16 or
nodal governance"-all of these approaches are characterized by a
greater attention to "power relations among legal spheres, the extent to
which any legal sphere expresses local normative standards, and social

156. Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, Changes in
Governance: A Cross-DisciplinaryReview of CurrentScholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv.
1, 3 (2008); see also Janet Hope, Dianne Nicol & John Braithwaite, Regulatory
Capitalism, Business Models and the Knowledge Economy, in REGULATORY
CAPITALISM: How IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER 109, 115-26 (John
Braitwaite ed., 2008); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342,
345-48 (2004).
See Chon, supra note 27, at 353-56; Errol Meidinger, Multi-InterestSelf157.
Governance Through Global Product Certification Progran es, in RESPONSIBLE
BUSINESS: SELF GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS
259, 286-87 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter eds., 2008) (stating that
standard-setting and certification in the area of sustainable forestry management, for
example, involves multi-stakeholder governance, in which various non-state actors such
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or trade associations set private standards
ultimately adopted by public agencies).
158. E g., Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law.: Direct Regulation, CoRegulation and Self-Regulation, CAHIERS DU CENTRE DE RECHERCHES INFORMATIQUE
ET DROIT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8-11), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1634832.
159. E g., Global Administrative Law - Resources: Concept and Working
Definition, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE, http://www.iilj.org/GAL/
GALworkingdefinition.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
160.
E g., Andrew T.F. Lang, Legal Regimes and Regimes of Knowledge:
Governing Global Services Trade (London Sch. Econ. Legal Studies, Working Paper
No. 15, 2009), www.1se.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2011);
see also Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Indicators as a
Technology of Global Governance (Inst. Int'l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2,
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2010-2.Davis2010),
available at
Kingsbury-Merry.pdf.
161.
Robert E. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemnic Governance: The
ChangingNature of Modern Jurisdiction,57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2008).
162. Eg., Meidinger, supra note 157, 259-60.
163.
Eg., Lobel, supra note 156, 345-48.
164. E.g., Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and PharmaceuticalMarkets: A
Nodal GovernanceApproach, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 401 (2004).
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interactions among spheres," 65 as well as to non-state actors,
alternative norms, and different governance sites and modalities.
Nodal governance, for example, describes sites "where
knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to manage a course of
events."" In the intellectual property area, Madison, Frischmann, and
Strandburg have analogously articulated the notion of a cultural
commons, based on Elinor Ostrom's work in the natural resources
area." A cultural commons, independent of markets or states, consists
of venues in which viable and flexible soft norms for intellectual
property may develop in "institutions intermediate between private
property and the state ... sometimes called "common property" or
"limited commons" and generally . . . collective (but not necessarily

governmental or even formal) means for sharing and making productive
and sustainable use of resources .

. .

. [in forms] various and highly

contextual." 68 These alternative models of governance all share an
emphasis on the interplay among various actors and on norm generation
through both public law and other mechanisms.
In copyright, as in most forms of intellectual property, a major
form of intergenerational equity is through the allocation of public
versus private rights to set the appropriate balance of short-term (static)
versus long-term (dynamic) effects. 169 How does copyright law and
policy address this and other aspects of intergenerational (including
educational) justice' through its treatment of knowledge, sticky or
Sally Engle Merry, International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship:
165.
Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 41 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE)
149, 151 (2008) ("Despite the excellent legal scholarship on international law processes
. . . there has been relatively little sociolegal scholarship in this domain. One
consequence of th[is] absence . . . is a lack of attention to three critical domains of
sociolegal analysis: the relations of power among legal actors and legal regimes,
processes of meaning making and legal consciousness, and the impact of various
structures of social relationships on informal social processes such as shaming and
social pressure.").
166. Scott Burris, Peter Drahos & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 30, 37 (2005).
167. Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 102, at 675-83.
168. Id. at 676; see also Antonelli, supra note 35 (positing newer governance
approaches between the extremes of pure markets and pure organizations for the
exploitation of localized technology).
169. Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright
Law, 3 REv. L. & EcON. 649 (2007) (arguing that the intellectual property policy
balance might be better understood as that between (1) allocating public versus private
rights, (2) promoting and internalizing externalities, and (3) promoting commercially
valued and socially valued activities).
170. HARRY BRIGHOUSE & INGRID ROBEYNS, Introduction: Social Pimary
Goods and Capabilitiesas Metrics of Justice, in MEASURING JUSTICE: PRIMARY GoODS
AND CAPABILITIEs 1, 211 (2010). According to Brighouse and Robeyns, this is where
the zones of "[wiell-being and agency freedom[]" intersect, where, for example, the
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otherwise? The more knowledge we codify through copyright and its
penumbra, perhaps the greater its reliability and spillover. But certain
kinds of knowledge remain uncommunicated for many reasons: cost
(whether in the form of displaced codebooks), implicit bias, lack of
absorptive capacity, lack of standardization, unraveling social ties with
attendant lack of trust, and so on. Progress in knowledge creation
facilitated most directly by intellectual property policy tends to coincide
with realms where codified knowledge systems are dominant. Sticky
knowledge systems, by contrast, are typically (although not totally or
always) overlooked in copyright policymaking. In the area of
education, which is so critical to intergenerational flourishing, sticky
knowledge may be more salient than codified knowledge:
The sectors where knowledge creation has occurred at an
extremely rapid pace are those in which the interrelationships
between science and technology are especially close and
intense. These are the sectors capable of carrying out
controlled experiments and thoroughly testing results while
maintaining constant liaison and feedback between the various
stages of experimentation and application....
Many sectors visibly fail to meet these conditions for
rapid progress. In the field of education, for instance, science
does not much 'enlighten' the art of teaching. It can hardly be
said to play a very strong role as a factor enabling the direct
production of systematic knowledge which translates into
'programmes that work' in the classroom and lecture theatre.
Education is not a field that lends itself well to
experimentation: what works with a pilot school may prove
hard to replicate elsewhere.

. .

. Education [ constitutes a

realm where knowledge is little codified. There is no
equivalent in teaching to the kinds of reference books and
documents used by doctors, lawyers or engineers. So, young
teachers begin their careers without the help of those 'sets of
codified instructions'. As a rule, the profession of teaching is
not organised to keep practitioners informed of alternative
approaches and solutions tested by others; instead, they
proceed by intuition and imitation of recognised practices in
the repertoire of 'master teachers'.m'
emphasis might be on "freedom to access a lesson through appropriate pedagogies .
. . [or] the freedom to access information about education, engage in discussion, and
make up one's mind about access to education for an adult without violence and
shame."
171. Id.
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The standard copyright accounts focusing on exploitation of the
public-goods aspect of intellectual property have influenced the
knowledge-production paths in many areas, including the education
domain-as compared to local knowledge or sticky knowledge. An
emphasis on public-law frameworks has contributed to the possible
undervaluation of norms or other softer mechanisms of governance
discussed in this Section. Understanding the reach of sticky knowledge
may point to regulatory alternatives to encourage knowledge reliability
and knowledge spillovers where that knowledge is typically difficult to
collate, demonstrate, gather, and/or pass on to others. Education,
ironically, is one of those latter realms, and knowledge governance
cannot be one-size-fits-all in this context.' 72 Teece pointed out many
years ago in his seminal work on complementary assets that service,
delivery, maintenance, and technical support (for example, for
computer software) often determine the commercial viability of
patented or fully disclosed knowledge goods."' These mostly servicebased or social aspects surrounding any particular knowledge goodonce protected by patent or copyright law-are critical.
In the educational sphere, complementary assets can include social
arrangements for optimal use of knowledge (whether in the form of
teacher training, student and institutional support, etc.) or such
combined social/physical infrastructure examples as XO computers for
educational delivery of knowledge to developing-world children.'74 The
focus in this Article is less on appropriability of and commercial returns
172. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property "from Below". Copyright and
Capabilityfor Education, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 803 (2007) (arguing for exceptions in
copyright for education). In addition to this suggestion, possible creative copyright
governance alternatives could promote, among other things: more textbooks and other
knowledge media in geographic areas with scarcity; liberal licensing provisions to
enable translations into text to speech by the disabled such as the blind; national
statutory exceptions for distance education, for rural inhabitants who still are the
majority of the world's population; alternative licensing models such as Creative
Commons, in conjunction with open education resources (OER) for digital education;
global minimum exceptions, in addition to national exceptions, to encourage crossborder transactions (reducing questions of conflict of laws); multilateral translation
exceptions to digital rights; managing the contract/public-law interface through reverse
notice and take-down provisions or limits to contractual over-rides to exceptions and
limitations.
173. David J. Teece, Profitingfrom TechnologicalInnovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration,Licensing and Public Policy, 15 REs. POL'Y 285 (1986).
174. Randall Stross, Two Billion Laptops? It May Not Be Enough?, N.Y.
TiMs, Apr. 18, 2010, at BU5; Graciela Rabajoli & Mo'nica Ba'ez, Uso tecnologi'as
y produccio'n contenidos educativos digitales en el Plan CEIBAL [Use of Technologies
and Production of Digital Educational Content in the Plan CEIBAL] (Mar. 2, 2009)
(unpublished PowerPoint presentation on file with author) (Uruguayan educators' report
on the use of XO computers, presented at the First Regional Dialogue of Educators on
the Implications of Copyright, Mar. 2-3, 2009).
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on knowledge than on its potential for positive spillovers and its
reliability (or authenticity). Nonetheless Teece's management insight is
applicable to educational goals, particularly because education is an
area permeated with social relations.
Sticky knowledge may be critical with regard to other areas of
intellectual property, such as traditional knowledge,"' or, for that
matter, any aspect of intellectual property law solicitous of folkways
and local cultural expressions, history, and context. As the Deep Forest
example shows, for instance, traditional cultural expression can be
marred by lack of absorptive capacity or perhaps even breaches of trust
on the part of the creative communities, intermediaries, and other
institutions. A vast range of concerns coincides with sticky knowledge
production and distribution, but the focus here is on copyright.
CONCLUSION
Dimensions of stickiness exist for a wide range of cultural
products affected by copyright: foreign language movies without
adequate sub-titles for monolingual viewers; avant-garde theater
performances without liner notes for uninitiated audiences; high-level
math websites by kindly college teaching assistants or professors
without explanations for casual Internet users; or-more trivially-text
messages without teenagers to decode the new grammar for their
clueless parents.
Due to the tremendous cultural, political, and social consequences
of different "knowledge societies""' contacting each other, identifying
sticky knowledge not just as part of a constellation or penumbra or
continuum, but rather as an active aspect of knowledge governanceincluding copyright-will help us encourage the production of more
reliable forms of knowledge as well as spillovers of knowledge for

175.

Charles McManis & Yolanda Teran, Trends and Scenarios in the Legal

Production of Traditional Knowledge, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS (Tzen Wong & Graham
Dutfield eds.) 2010, http://www.piipa.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=
article&id=99&Itemid=77; Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of TraditionalKnowledge,
70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (2007).
176. David & Foray, supra note 10, at 29, 45; see also MARY LOUISE PRATT,
IMPERIAL EYES: TRAVEL WRITING AND TRANSCULTURATION 6 (1st ed. 1992) ("While the
imperial metropolis tends to understand itself as determining the periphery (in the
emanating glow of the civilizing mission or the cash flow of development, for
example), it habitually blinds itself to the ways in which the periphery determines the
metropolis-beginning, perhaps, with the latter's obsessive need to present and re-

present its peripheries and its others continually to itself Travel writing, among other
institutions, is heavily organized in the service of that imperative." (emphasis added)).
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intergenerational equity. We may be able to tell each other more if we
know what we cannot tell, and why we cannot tell it.
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